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this individualized sentencing de-
termination was cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
The Court refused, however, to ex-
tend this individualized sentencing 
determination beyond capital cases. 
Id. at 2702. 
The Court reasoned that the death 
penalty "differs from all other forms 
of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree, but in kind. It is unique in its 
total irrevocability." Id. (quoting 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
306 (1972». The Court explained 
that even with a sentence of life 
without possibility of parole, there 
still existed possibilities of execu-
tive clemency and legislative reduc-
tion of sentences to take effect retro-
actively. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 
2702. The Court further noted that 
the following sentences could pro-
duce only negligible differences: life 
with parole eligibility in twenty 
years, long-term sentences without 
eligibility of parole for a 65-year-
old man, and a life sentence without 
parole. Id. The Court reasoned that 
regardless of the difference, no sen-
tence could be compared with death, 
and, thus, the Court refused to ex-
pand individualized sentencing be-
yond capital cases. The Court held, 
therefore, that a mandatory sentence 
of life in prison without the possi-
bility of parole did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
In a strong dissent, Justice White 
asserted that while the Eighth 
Amendment contained no specific 
language as to a proportionality re-
quirement, it did forbid excessive 
fines. Id. at 2709. (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice White noted that it 
would not be unreasonable to find 
that excessiveness should be mea-
sured according to the crime com-
mitted, concluding that imposing 
any punishment disproportionate to 
the crime committed would be a 
violation of the Eighth 
Amendment's cruel and unusual 
punishment clause. Id. Justice White 
reasoned that "[t]he death penalty is 
appropriate in some cases and not in 
others. The same should be true of 
punishment by imprisonment." Id. 
at 2712. 
In a plurality opinion, the Su-
preme Court found that a mandatory 
sentence did not automatically be-
come cruel and unusual by virtue of 
its mandatory nature. The Court 
distinguished capital cases, where 
an individualized sentencing deter-
mination is mandatory, from all other 
forms of punishment, where such a 
determination is not required. Thus, 
the Court refused to extend the indi-
vidualized capital sentencing doc-
trine beyond death penalty cases. In 
so doing, the Court gave great lati-
tude to state legislatures for deter-
mination of reasonable punishments 
while usurping a sentencingjudge's 
ability to consider any mitigating 
factors the defendant may wish to 
present. 
- Ellen Poris 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company v. Haslip: MASSIVE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARD INTENDED TO 
PUNISH AND DETER 
WRONGDOERS IN CIVIL 
SUIT DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. 
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032(1991), 
the United States Supreme Court 
held that a $1,040,000.00 punitive 
damages award, which was more 
than four times the amount of com-
pensatory damages claimed, did not 
violate the Due Process Clause of 
of whether due process acts as a 
check on undue jury discretion to 
award punitive damages in the ab-
sence of any express statutory limit. 
Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr. was a li-
censed agent for both Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company (Pa-
cific Mutual) and Union Fidelity 
Life Insurance Company (Union). 
After selling an insurance package 
to the respondents, both employees 
of an Alabama municipality, Ruffin 
misappropriated premiums paid to 
him by respondents' employer for 
payment to Union. This caused 
respondent's health insurance to 
lapse without their knowledge. 
In May 1982, respondents filed 
an action in state court claiming 
fraud by Ruffin and seeking to hold 
Pacific Mutual liable under a theory 
of respondeat superior. Following 
the trial court's charge on liability, 
the jury was instructed that if it 
determined there was liability for 
fraud, it could award punitive dam-
ages. The jury was further instructed 
that the purpose of punitive dam-
ages was not to compensate the plain-
tiff, but rather to punish the defen-
dant and deter him from doing such 
wrong in the future. 
Included among the damages was 
a verdict for Respondent Haslip of 
over one million dollars. This sum 
included a punitive damages award 
more than four times the amount of 
compensatory damages claimed. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama af-
firmed the trial court and specifi-
cally upheld the punitive damages 
award. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to review 
Pacific Mutual's claim that the pu-
nitive damage award was the prod-
uct of unbridled jury discretion and 
violative of its due process rights. 
The Court first addressed the 
the Fourteenth Amendment. After constitutionalityofthepunitivedam-
circumventing the issue in the past, ages and outlined the common-law 
the Court finally addressed the issue approach for assessing them. Under 
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the traditional common-law ap-
proach, the amount of the punitive 
award was initially determined by a 
jury instructed to consider the grav-
ity of the wrong and the need to 
deter similar wrongful conduct. The 
jury's determination then was re-
viewed by trial and appellate courts 
to ensure that it was reasonable. 
Hasiip, 111 S. Ct. at 1042. The 
Court concluded that this common-
law method, determined to be con-
stitutional by every state and federal 
court that has considered the issue, 
was not so inherently unfair as to 
deny due process or be per se uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 1043. 
The Court, however, flatly re-
jected the notion that the amount of 
punitive damages imposed would 
never be unconstitutional and con-
ceded that unlimited jury orjudicial 
discetion in fixing punitive dam-
ages may invite extreme results that 
would be unacceptable under the 
Due Process Clause. Id. The Court 
stated that it could not draw a math-
ematical bright line between the 
constitutionally acceptab Ie and con-
stitutionally unacceptable that would 
fit every case. Id. Instead, it was 
held that when a case was tried to a 
jury, general concerns of reason-
ableness and adequate guidance 
properly enter into the constitutional 
calculus. Id. 
punitive damages. Id. at 1044. Al-
though the Court found the jury 
instructions allowed a significant 
amount of discretion, such discre-
tion was not unlimited but confined 
to deterrence and retribution. The 
instructions enlightened the jury as 
to the punitive damages' nature and 
purpose, identified the damages as 
punishment for civil wrongdoing of 
the kind involved, and explained 
that their imposition was not com-
pulsory. Id. The Court, therefore, 
concluded that the instructions rea-
sonably accomodated Pacific 
Mutual's interest in rational 
decisionmaking and Alabama's in-
terest in meaningful individualized 
assessment of appropriate deterrence 
and retribution. Id. 
The Court then found that the 
trial court's post-trial procedures, in 
accord with the Alabama case which 
espoused the test for scrutinizing 
such awards, ensured meaningful 
and adequate review ofajury's im-
position of punitive damages. Id. 
Lastly, the Court determined that 
further review by the Alabama Su-
preme Court provided an additional 
check on the jury's or trial court's 
discretion and made certain that the 
punitive damages were reasonable 
in their amount and rational in light 
oftheir purpose to punish and deter. 
Id. at 1045. 
With these concerns in mind, the In the sole dissent, Justice 
Court reviewed the punitive dam- O'Connor opined that common-law 
ages assessed against Pacific Mu- procedures for awarding punitive 
tual and concluded that, although damages lacked meaningful instruc-
large in comparison to the compen- tions to the jury and, therefore, may 
satory damage award, the award did result in indiscriminant and poten-
not violate due process. This deci- tially harmful awards. Id. at 1056 
sion was based on the fact that the (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice 
award was grounded on objective O'Connor stated that the Court 
criteria and was subject to the full should have issued specific guide-
panapoly of procedural protections. lines forajuryto follow when award-
Id. at 1046. ing punitive damages. 
First, the Court found the trial In Haslip, the Supreme Court 
court's instructions placed reason- held that the common-law method 
able constraints on the exercise of for assessing punitive damages 
the jury's discretion in assessing awards were not per se unconstitu-
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tional and upheld a jury's compara-
tively large punitive damages award. 
Applying a standard of reasonable-
ness, the Court found that the spe-
cific punitive damages award, which 
was more than four times the amount 
of compensatory damages claimed, 
did not violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court's holding was 
based on the fact that the jury in-
structions were severely limited, the 
trial court's post-verdict hearing 
ensured meaningful and adequate 
review of the punitive award, and 
the state supreme court provided an 
additional check for ensuring the 
reasonableness of the punitive dam-
age award. 
This case represents the Supreme 
Court's first consideration ofa due 
process challenge to punitive dam-
ages awards and recognizes that not 
all such awards are necessarily con-
stitutional. In the future, therefore, 
a punitive damages award could be 
considered excessive and unreason-
able. However, the holding in this 
case indicates that the Court is will-
ing to consider very large punitive 
damages awards as within the sphere 
of reasonableness. 
-JoAnne M Breslin 
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